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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2426 
 ___________ 
 
 MIDDLEBROOK AT MONMOUTH 
      
 v. 
 
 BRUCE J. LIBAN, 
   Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-03846) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  March 23, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In the District Court, Bruce J. Liban filed what he explicitly termed an appeal of a 
decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court.  His submission to the District Court was not 
a model of clarity.  However, from the documents he presented, it is apparent that his 
landlord, Middlebrook at Monmouth, brought an eviction suit in the Superior Court of 
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New Jersey (Law Division - Special Civil Part of Monmouth County) against him for 
violating the terms of his lease by not keeping the apartment in clean and sanitary 
conditions and by creating a hazard.  After taking testimony, the trial judge held that 
Liban had violated his lease and ordered a judgment for possession in favor of the 
landlord.  Although Liban did not offer evidence that he appealed from the judgment in 
the state court system, he asserted that he had exhausted his state appellate remedies.   
 Liban listed several issues which he identified as errors made by the trial court 
judge, such as ruling without allowing him to cross-examine a witness, interrupting his 
testimony, and receiving false testimony.  He contended that any one of the errors was a 
sufficient basis to vacate the state court judgment.  Based on the claimed errors, he asked 
the District Court to dismiss the eviction suit against him, stay the order of eviction and 
allow him back into the apartment, and disallow any future eviction suit by Middlebrook 
at Monmouth.   
 The District Court reviewed Liban‟s filing and dismissed it pursuant to the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
1
  Liban filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that he 
brought due process claims that must be heard because the state court trial judge did not 
allow him to present a defense to the eviction suit.  The District Court denied the motion.  
 Liban appeals.  He contends that the Rooker-Feldman  doctrine does not bar his 
suit because his due process claims were not decided by the state court.  He argues that 
violations of his due process rights stemmed from the state court trial judge‟s errors and 
                                                 
1
The doctrine derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
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that her errors are substantial enough to merit a different outcome in the eviction case.  
As he asked the District Court, he asks us to dismiss the eviction case, bar any future 
such case, and allow him to return to his apartment.  He also presents a motion in which 
he requests oral argument and permission to supplement the record. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court=s order dismissing Liban‟s suit.  See Turner v. Crawford Square 
Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) (AOur review of the district court‟s 
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is plenary.@)  Generally, our review of an 
order denying a motion for reconsideration is for abuse of discretion, but to the extent the 
denial is based on the interpretation and application of a legal precept, our review is 
plenary.  See Koshatka v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
The District Court did not err in dismissing Liban‟s complaint or denying Liban‟s 
motion for reconsideration because his suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., the Supreme Court confined the 
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to “cases brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.”  544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).   Accordingly, for the doctrine to apply, four 
requirements must be met:  “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 
„complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments‟; (3) those judgments were 
rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 
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to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Liban‟s suit falls within the class of cases to which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
applies.  He lost the eviction suit in state court before he filed his action in the District 
Court.  In his complaint, he complained of injuries caused by the judgment in favor of his 
landlord.
2
  See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166-67 (presenting 
examples of when an injury is caused by a state court judgment instead of a defendant‟s 
action).  He clearly and explicitly sought review and rejection of the state court decision.  
As he said, he filed suit because he wished to appeal in the District Court the order issued 
by the state court.  However, federal district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over 
state court decisions.  See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284-85.  They cannot review 
proceedings conducted by a state tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in 
accordance with law.  See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 169.  
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  We deny Liban‟s 
motion for oral argument and to supplement the record.   
 
                                                 
2
 Although Liban described, among other things, alleged due process violations by the trial 
judge, they were not independent claims, as he asserts.  He presented them in support of his 
claim that the state court judgment should be overturned; he did not sue the trial judge.  Even if 
he had, the claims against her, essentially complaints about what evidence she allowed and did 
not allow at trial, would be barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.  See Mireles v. Waco, 
502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). 
